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MR. JUSTICE BLACK: The Man and His Opinions. By John
P. Frank,* with an Introduction by Charles A. Beard.
New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1949. Pp. xix, 357.
$4.00.
In a good and ancient book it is written, "By their
fruits ye shall know them." John P. Frank in Mr. Justice
Black: The Man and His Opinions has very effectively
sketched the life of this remarkable man to give you what
the newspaper men call "background" for the understand-
ing of his opinions. Professor Charles A. Beard in the
preface laments the fact that when he was a student of con-
stitutional law there was no study of the social origins
and intellectual processes of the justices who told us by their
opinions what the Constitution meant. Mr. Frank has
rendered a service to the student and to the practitioner in
presenting at this time his most interesting and readable
book. Mr. Frank, who served for a time during the war as
Justice Black's law clerk and who has since solidly established
himself as a writer and teacher of law, is well qualified to
write about his subject. While Mr. Frank is an ardent
admirer of Justice Black, he is no Boswell-he paints his
portrait "waits and all."
Justice Black is and will ever be a controversial figure.
He never drifts with the current. His audience is sharply
divided; because he never leaves you in doubt about where
he stands, it is inevitable that you support or oppose him.
His adherents are immediately attracted by his briar-sharp
intellect, his forthright, courageous championship of causes
he believes in, and his prodigious capacity for work. Even
his opponents concede him these virtues.
Justice Black came to the bench, as Mr. Frank points
out, under the greatest cloud and the most vicious personal
attack ever made upon an appointee to the Supreme Court,
not excepting the incredible attack upon Justice Brandeis.
The assault upon Justice Black was as shabby and unwar-
ranted as that upon Justice Brandeis. If I understand
Kluxers, and I think I do after living through their "reign"
in Indiana in the 1920's, there is none of their arrogance
* Assistant Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law.
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or bigotry about Justice Black, whom I have known long and
intimately. The forces opposed to him were not concerned
with his "joiner proclivities" down in Alabama, which were
legion, or his Kluxer philosophy, which did not exist. They
were concerned with what he thought about the social and
economic questions of the day. His views on those subjects
they did not like.
With his roots deep in the clay soil of the eroded hills
of Alabama and his sensitive nature scarred by the inequali-
ties and injustices he observed all around him, Black came
up in his profession and in politics at death grips with the
forces responsible for the conditions about him. As police
judge, prosecutor, lawyer, and senator, he fought the battles
of the little fellow against prejudice, oppression, and the
overbearing position of entrenched wealth represented by
the utilities, the steel and coal corporations, the railroads,
and the planters. It was a foregone conclusion that when
Justice Black went on the bench his sympathy for the under-
dog and his intense love of democracy would lead him to
fight there as he had fought before for liberty, humanity, and
a wide berth for the processes of democracy to work both
through the state legislatures and the Congress. It was clear
that his eye would be focused always upon the personal liber-
ties of the individual so that neither the state nor the fed-
eral authorities encroached upon such liberties without war-
rant.
Mr. Frank, after his biography of the Justice, treats
some of his most significant Court opinions and dissents.
Preceding each, he summarizes the issues involved, the prin-
cipal points decided, and how the Court stood on the case.
Then he sets forth the heart of the opinion in condensed
form, so that it reads like an essay on the subject dealt with
in the opinion. Justice Black's opinions lend themselves to
this treatment as they are always succinct and clear. Like
a skilled surgeon with his scalpel, he cuts directly to the
heart of the matter and lays bare the problem in a few bold
strokes. You read the opinion thus treated with easy under-
standing; you may not agree with Justice Black, but you al-
ways know what he is talking about. In my own experience,
I often read an opinion of another member of the Court and
pass on to a dissent by Black before I understand what the
case is all about. Black has the happy faculty of pointing up
"Hamlet" in a few short, crisp sentences.
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Mr. Frank has not attempted to report a great many
of the Justice's opinions but has selected outstanding ones
which illuminate the course which the Justice has set. They
are presented under two main headings. Under the first,
Control of the Economy, are the subdivisions Extent of Fed-
eral Power, Extent of State Power, and Problems of Regula-
tion. The second heading is Civil Rights, with subheadings
of Basic Theory, Speech, Press, Religion, Fair Trial, Mar-
riage and Divorce, and Aliens.
The limits of this review will not permit me even to
comment upon each of the cited decisions. You will find
Justice Black giving the boldest sweep to state and federal
legislatures and their administrative creatures, even to the
point of denying the Court's right to review the rate orders
of commissions on constitutional grounds. Legislative and
administrative acts that do not invade an individual's civil
liberties are most sympathetically treated by him. Even
when Congress has authorized review to determine whether
there is substantial evidence to support findings, Justice
Black has been most ingenious in finding reasons to support
the order. He has been consistent in his views in upholding
all fact-finding agencies, including juries, as witness his de-
cisions under the Federal Employers' Liability Act and his
dissent in the Galloway case.' Justice Black has never quite
said so in an opinion, but I think he believes that jurors
are as capable as judges in fact finding, and if a case is
triable by a jury, it should never be taken from the jury.2
The findings of a commission or of a jury are to be respected.
-Under the heading of "Civil Rights" Justice Black soars
to his greatest heights and carries with him a majority of
1. Galloway v. United States, 319 U. S. 372, 396 (1943).
2. Thus in the Galloway case, supra note 1 at 406, Justice Black
stated that in his view the following instruction, taken from
Tarter v. United States, 17 F. Supp. 691, 692-3 (1937), indicates
the "minimum meaning" of the Seventh Amendment:
"The Seventh Amendment to the Constitution guar-
antees a jury trial in law cases, where there is substantial
evidence to support the claim of the plaintiff in an action.
If a single witness testifies to a fact sustaining the issue
between the parties, or if reasoning minds might reach
different conclusions from the testimony of a single wit-
ness, one of which would substantially support the issue
of the contending party, the issue must be left to thejury. Trial by jury is a fundamental guaranty of the
rights of the people, and judges should not search the evi-




his colleagues, especially in his opinions dealing with fair
trials, the selection of juries, the handling of confessions,
and the providing for counsel. In Johnson v. Zerbst3 he said
the constitutional provision for counsel was jurisdictional,
and the failure to have counsel provided at each step of the
case in a federal court, in the absence of a clear showing
that the defendant 'intelligently and understandingly waived
the right, nullified the court's action and entitled the de-
fendant to be released from the sentence he was serving.
Such denial of counsel, he said, violated the Sixth Amend-
ment to the Federal Constitution. In Betts v. Brady,4 in
which a Maryland state court had refused counsel, the ma-
jority held that the Sixth Amendment, at least in a non-
capital case, was not drawn into the ambit of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and that the state violated no federal right
when it denied counsel. Justice Black dissented for himself
and two others, taking the broad position that the Fourteenth
Amendment made secure against invasion by the state all
the rights of individuals guaranteed by the Federal Bill of
Rights. On that broad proposition, the Court stands five to
four, with Justice Black leading the minority. The majority
freely admits Justice Black's position as to the First Amend-
ment to the Federal Constitution and probably as to the
Sixth Amendment in a capital case. Why the Court goes
part of the way but not all the way with Justice Black is,
to say the least, illogical.
When you have read the civil rights cases IMr. Frank
cites, you will, I think, be stimulated to read all that this
great liberal justice has said concerning civil rights. I know
he was only a police judge. I heard his traducers scoffingly
say so! Read Chambers v. Florida5 and you will read the
classic burning words of a truly great judge, words that will
echo down the corridors of time as long as courts shall
stand to administer "Justice under the law." Don't take my
word for it. I quote from the historian Beard: "In his opin-
ion which. will ring with power as long as liberty and justice
are cherished in our country, Justice Black asserted with
moderated eloquence great American principles of human
8. 304 U. S. 458 (1938).
4. 316 U. S. 455 (1942).
5. 309 U. S. 227 (1940).
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liberty. The whole document ought to be read by all citizens
who care for the perpetuity of the Republic."
John Frank has distinguished himself as a writer and
has rendered a service to students of the law and courts,
as well as the bar, in giving us Mr. Justice Black: The Man
and His Opinions.
Sherman Mintont
CARTELS OR COMPETITION? The Economics of International
Controls by Business and Government. By George W.
Stocking* and Myron W. Watkins.** New York: Twen-
tieth Century Fund, 1948. Pp. xi, 516. $4.00.
This is the second in a series of three studies growing
out of a notable survey by the Twentieth Century Fund on
the subject of international and domestic monopoly. The
first, entitled Cartels in Action, Case Studies in Business
Diplomacy, published in 1946, described the formation,
growth and specific effects of cartels in eight industries.,
The third volume will survey the progress of concentration
of industrial control in the United States.
In recent years literally hundreds of volumes of new
facts have come to light on the subject of cartels and monop-
oly. There have been a number of notable Senate investiga-
tions such as those on the National Defense Program (Tru-
man), on Patents (Bone), on Scientific and Technical Mobili-
zation (Kilgore) and on the Elimination of German Re-
sources for War (Kilgore). There have been scores of anti-
trust cases, hundreds of wartime intelligence reports, and
many boxes of files seized by the Alien Property Custodian.
There has also been extensive documentation here and abroad
relative to various United Nations' conferences on shipping,
air transport, food and agriculture, tariffs and the proposed
Charter for an International Trade Organization.
Merely to survey such a wealth of material is a Hercu-
lean.job. But Professors Stocking and Watkins have made
f Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
* Chairman, Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University.
** Professor of Economics, New York University.
1. Sugar, rubber, nitrogen, iron and steel, aluminum, magnesium,
electric lamps, and chemicals.
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